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Abstract The issue of identity cards is hotly debated in many countries, but it often
seems to be an oddly backward-looking debate that presumes outdated “Orwellian”
architectures. In the modern world, surely we should be debating the requirements
for national identity management schemes, in which identity cards may or may not
be a useful implementation, before we move on to architecture. If so, then, what
should a U.K. national identity management scheme for the 21st century look like?
Can we assemble a set of requirements understandable to politicians, professionals
and the public? We’ve certainly had some difficulty to date. One reason might be
that we lack a compelling, narrative vision. As a result, we’re constructing a legacy
system that will subvert the rational goals of worthwhile scheme. We’re not aiming
high enough. The technology, I will argue, can deliver far more than the politicians,
professionals and public imagine: In particular, it can deliver the apparently
paradoxical result of more security and more privacy by exploiting smart cards,
biometrics and cryptography. In this paper, I will set out a high-level vision of what a
forward-looking national identity management and identity “card” scheme should
look like: Dr. Who’s psychic paper. Not only is this a simple, clear vision that is
familiar to the expert and layperson alike, but it’s a very useful artistic representation
of the capabilities of the technology. I will further suggest that a utility
implementation of identity infrastructure can deliver the on this vision in a practical
way, and that all of the technology needed to create an ID scheme for the future
already exists.
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The detailed timetable for the introduction of a national identity scheme in the U.K. was
announced by the Home Secretary on 6th March 2008 in a speech at the London “think-
tank” DEMOS. I was excited to be invited to be present, but to be honest I felt rather let
down afterwards. That’s because I am (as are many others) a supporter of a national
scheme that includes a smart identity card for identity management (Dresner 2008), but
I want a modern identity scheme that embodies a vision for the future and works for
eBay as well as Barclays, Facebook as well as Heathrow. Unlike many other
countries, the U.K. is beginning its transition to the smart identity world with a clean
sheet of paper, having no existing identity register or identity card. It therefore had the
opportunity to create a modern identity scheme with inspirational properties: using
technology to deliver security and privacy in a new way. Yet after all the consultations
and consultants, what was announced was a watered-down version of the biometric
database originally envisaged, a rather pointless (in my opinion) biographical database
and a voluntary card of indeterminate functionality or usefulness.
Especially disappointing is the lack of vision. None of the examples that the
Home Secretary gave in her DEMOS speech—opening a bank account, obtaining
welfare benefits or checking the status of job applicants—actually require a card
(smart or otherwise) or demand any infrastructure beyond a unique identifying
number. When you tell the bank your identifying number, they may as well type it
into a government web page (after all, there is nothing remotely secret about the
identifying number that the government is envisaging) and get back your picture to
see if you’re telling the truth: no card, no fingerprints, no problem. The government
clearly does not envisage the proposed identity card as delivering any more
functionality than the cardboard version that was discontinued in 1952.
Yet elsewhere there has been a shift in perspective so that some countries are
beginning to look to their national identity schemes to deliver new functionality and
new capabilities, not simply to emulate cardboard in a more secure fashion. If we
look the around the European Union to see how other schemes are developing, we
find that 21 member states either have or are planning to issue smart identity cards
and many of these have innovative aspects that are worth studying (Naumann 2008):
& Earlier this year the German government announced that their ID card would use
pseudonyms to protect online privacy.
& In Austria, they use sector-specific ID numbers to protect privacy.
& In many Scandinavian countries, the public/private integration is such that people
can log on to e-government services using the banking authentication schemes.
& In Belgium, tens of thousands of people every month use their ID cards in PCs to
check their own records.
& In Finland, the ID card can now be paired with the OpenID online authentication
standard, enabling Finns to use their cards for logging in to any website that
accepts OpenID.
& In Estonia, the ID application is being issued in Subscriber Identification
Modules (SIMs) by the largest mobile operator, paving the way for citizens to
use their mobile phones to access e-government, e-banking, e-commerce and
e-everything else securely and easily.
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The Home Secretary announced no such functionality or applications. I was
looking forward to hearing a vision that would be a testament to British design flair,
engineering ingenuity and innovation. I was disappointed to hear nothing of the sort,
so rather than criticise I would like to suggest a vision of my own: an ID register that
improves security and an ID card that improves privacy.
A vision for identity
Let’s create a vision for a 21st-century identity card. Let’s create a vision that we can
communicate effectively. Let’s create a vision that is founded onminimising the storage
of personal data (Crosby 2008). Let’s create a vision that the public and the
government can understand. Let’s create a vision that contains some genuine
innovation, some excitement and some potential for future development. But most of
all, let’s create a vision that is founded in the mass media, because that’s where the
British public get their science and technology education (Lacohee 2007). I would
suggest therefore that, as in so many other walks of life, Dr. Who should be our guide.
British readers will be familiar, of course, with Dr. Who’s psychic paper. As any
devotee of the BBC’s wonderful series knows, the psychic paper shows the
“inspector” whatever it is that they need to see. If the border guard is looking for a
British passport, the psychic paper looks like a British passport. If the customs
officer on Alpha Centuri wants to see a Betelguesian quarantine certificate, the
psychic paper looks like a Betelguesian quarantine certificate. The variant I propose
is psychic ID. Unlike Dr. Who’s psychic paper, psychic ID only shows the inspector
what he or she wants to see if the holder has the relevant credential.
To see what I mean, let’s begin with the most mundane of the use cases discussed
by the Prime Minister in his speech on security and liberty in June 2008 (Brown
2008). You are trying to get into a nightclub and you need to prove to the bouncer
that you are over 18. The bouncer is looking for a credential that proves you are over
18. You show your psychic ID to the bouncer and all it reveals to the bouncer is
whether you are over 18 or not. (Your name, age, address, weight and driving
convictions are none of the bouncer’s business.) Your age qualification is all that the
bouncer is entitled to see, so that is all they do see. Provided you are actually over
18, of course. If you are not, the psychic ID remains blank, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 What the nightclub doorman sees
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below. The laws of mathematics, rather than ombudsmen, enforce this mode of
operation: no matter how devious, untrustworthy or computer-savvy the bouncer
may be, he cannot persuade the psychic ID to divulge anything he does not have the
key to.
Practical use cases
It is not possible to envisage every single application of the identity utility
infrastructure but we can set out some basic categories by considering two axes: the
connection to the NIR (ie, either online or offline) and the transaction locus (ie, either
attended, unattended or remote). At high level, the infrastructure would need to be able
to support all six categories of use case, each of which would require appropriate
authentication to be of practical use. The authentication requirements would naturally
vary between these use cases (see Table 1). A PIN might be acceptable for logging in
to a chatroom, to point out an obvious case, whereas ordering a new passport might
require a higher-integrity “three factor” authentication.
This classification means that we can examine the various possibilities in a
structured way, beginning with the most prosaic example: the offline attended
situation discussed above, where the ID card holder is trying to prove that they are
over 18 in order to get into a nightclub.
Since psychic paper does not, in fact, exist, Fig. 1. is merely a simulation: the
picture of my good self or the blank red rectangle cannot be beamed directly into the
brain of the nightclub bouncer (yet). Therefore some device or contrivance is needed
to act as the interface: the picture would actually be displayed not on the card itself
but on the bouncer’s mobile phone or a turnstile at the nightclub or a small display
next to the door (as shown in Fig. 2), depending on the implementation appropriate
to the establishment.
In other circumstances, someone might be entitled to obtain more information
from the psychic ID. Perhaps when I visit a polyclinic, the receptionist is allowed to
know whether I am entitled to free health care in the U.K. and, if so, what my health
service number is. In that case, provided that my psychic ID recognises the
receptionist’s authority to ask, the receptionist would see precisely that information.
But nothing else, as Fig. 3 illustrates.
The general principle is that if we don’t want personal data to leak (as it
inevitably will, the more places it is stored (Learning to live with Big Brother 2007))
then we shouldn’t give it to people unnecessarily. The government currently plans
for the ID card to display a 16 digit national identity registration number, full name,
Table 1 Authentication requirements
Attended Unattended Remote
Online At the bank At the border At the passport office
Fingerprint recognition Fingerprint & Iris Voice authentication
Offline At the nightclub At the library At the chatroom
Face Voice authentication PIN verification
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nationality, date and place of birth, ICAO machine-readable travel document
(MRTD) data, and a black and white photo (Hines 2007). I think this is already
too much. Let’s be ruthless about minimizing the display of personal data: the
psychic ID will have nothing printed on it except perhaps a photograph of the holder,
perhaps some kind of card number for administrative reasons (which is not related to
the sector-specific ID numbers that the card stores) and it will divulge nothing except
the information that its interrogator is entitled to see.
This means that a key feature of the psychic ID must be that it provides only those
unique identifying numbers relevant to the questioner. The polyclinic receptionist
cannot see my financial services identification numbers, whatever they may be, any
more than a bank can see my health service number. If I want to, I can tell the clinic
my financial services number, naturally. Similarly, I may wish to tell my bank my
health service number. But that is under my control: the clinic cannot obtain the
number from my psychic ID and an unscrupulous financial organisation cannot
extract my health service number behind my back.
The reason for insisting on this feature is to partition for privacy purposes but also
to minimise the impact of data breaches: If hackers break into the polyclinic
database, all they can obtain is my health service number and they cannot use it to
Fig. 3 What the receptionist at the clinic sees
Fig. 2 Psychic ID doesn’t
actually exist, so we need a
device
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set about looting my bank account. We cannot assume perfect security and plan on
the basis that disgruntled or incompetent employees will never disclose personal
data: Consider the recent case of the Chilean government employee who published
their national identity register (well, just over half of it) on the web! Partitioning is a
simple defence. Thus, when I go to the bank to open an account, the psychic ID
shows the bank only the information it is allowed to see (Fig. 4).
I hope it is clear what is being envisaged. In this vision, the national identity card
is a special kind psychic paper (without the display) and it is the component of the
national identity scheme that makes life better for citizens because it protects their
privacy.
The scheme must improve security as well, and any national identity scheme that
is to really deliver more security must be used universally: It must become a kind of
utility that both individuals and organisations draw on as and when required.
Therefore, organisations would use the same psychic ID system instead of creating
their own disconnected, stand-alone versions. By sharing the identity utility
infrastructure, the costs are reduced to everyone. The psychic ID works in the same
way at the organisational level. If I come along to the Home Office to attend a meeting,
then I wave my psychic paper at the guard on the door, who can immediately see
(Fig. 5) whether to let me in or not.
Virtual identity
The identity scheme that the psychic ID uses must extend across both real and virtual
environments. It would be crazy, obviously, to design a system for the 21st century
that only works in physical, attended environments. In the virtual environment,
however, the requirements are more complicated. One of the simplest ways to
demonstrate both how non-intuitive some aspects of the problem are, but also how
this use of new technology can deliver new solutions, is to consider what I have
called before the Chatroom Paradox. I can state it very simply in this way: My kids
want to go into chatrooms to discuss everything from computer games to saving the
planet. I will only allow them into chatrooms if I know that the other people in the
chatrooms aren’t serial killers, perverts and so forth. In order to make sure of this, I
therefore want the name and address of everybody else in the chatroom so that I can
validate them against sex-offenders’ registers. However, if somebody else in the
Fig. 4 What the employee of the bank sees
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chatroom wants my kids’ names and address to check them against a register, I don’t
want to give it to them. What if there’s a mistake and they really are a serial killer or
pervert? This then is the paradox: In order to harness the power of the Internet, the
exponential curve of Reed’s Law and the “Here comes everybody” future, I want full
disclosure from everybody else who wants to be part of the sub-group but will refuse
any kind of disclosure on my side. Stalemate.
Psychic ID to the rescue! By connecting my psychic ID to the Internet, remote
counterparties can “see” the psychic ID in just same way as the receptionist, cashier,
bouncer and guard. In the chatroom case, however, it is important that the identity is
entirely pseudonymous in case there is a breach or a leak. Thus, as shown in Fig. 6,
my kids plug the psychic ID into the laptop and punch in the PIN and then their
pseudonymous identities are revealed but the actual identities remain concealed
(Birch 2003). I am assuming here that the psychic ID is being used as a component
of some form of user-centric identity management systems, so that each persons’
psychic ID card will actually store a handful of different identities, to be used in
different circumstances. This is a more sophisticated extension of the psychic ID
concept, because in some cases I might be Dave Birch, the UK citizen. In others, I
might choose to be Dave Birch the Consult Hyperion employee. In others, Leadbelly
Gutbucket, mightiest of the Dwarven heroes of Ravenscrag Pass. Far from seeing
multiple identities as a way for undesirables to hide (Harrison 2007), we should
Fig. 6 What the operator of the chat room sees
Fig. 5 What the home office security guard sees
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celebrate them as one of the great benefits of a national identity management
scheme. (I’ve already thought of the tag line for the advertisements: Who do you
want to be today?)
Note that in what I would call a “strongly user-centric” identity management
system, I ought to be able to tell my psychic ID who I want to be on a “per
transaction” basis, presumably defaulting to the “most” pseudonymous identity
because, in the general case, identity is not relevant to a transaction. So, just as the
typical wallet contains three or four bank cards, the typical psychic ID will contain
three or four identities1. While some, perhaps one, of the multiple identities held in
the psychic ID will be “underwritten” by the government, in the general case they
will be attested to by private organisations: Barclays Bank, perhaps, or Vodafone or
the World of Warcraft.
These examples serve to illustrate the crucial elements of the identity utility: that
it can be used in a variety of circumstances, that it protects personal information to
enhance privacy, that it delivers security to where it is needed and that it can be
understood by an average member of the public (eg, me).
Building the utility
Now, one might anticipate a certain amount of criticism for basing the vision of a
central component of future national infrastructure on a children’s science fiction series
(although, I have to say, Star Wars worked quite well for the Ronald Reagan back in
the 1980s). Therefore to demonstrate that this is a practical concept, it’s important to
explore how the psychic ID would actually work. Is psychic ID like time travel,
perpetual motion or Connecting for Health, an appealing vision but something that
will never work in the real world, or is it a practical way forward? I claim that not
only is it eminently practical but we already have the technology to build it.
Let’s begin by picturing the infrastructure that the psychic ID will use. One way
to build a practical, useful, successful identity management infrastructure is as an
identity utility (Hardie 2007). Let us assume that the identity utility will be regulated
by the government as a utility, with “OFID” or something like that in charge, but not
necessarily provided by the government, and focus on how it would operate rather
than who would operate it. The operation of the identity utility would be, from our
perspective, founded on five key principles that we can use to guide our thinking on
implementation: these are universality, symmetry, speed, practicality and extensibility
(McEvoy 2007).
Universality
The process for conducting an identity transaction should be exactly the same,
regardless of the status of any individual: nobody (not even the government) should
1 One might further imagine brokers springing up to manage identity and credentials on behalf of
individuals, both in the customer relationship management (CRM) model of the kind envisaged by John
Harrison with eDentity and in the vendor relationship management (VRM) model of the kind envisaged
by Adrianna Lukas with The Mine.
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be privileged within the architecture. It must be no less applicable to two people
from different continents as to next-door neighbours: everyone should be able to
inspect psychic paper. They may not see anything, of course, but they should be able
to try. To meet the international requirement, it may be that the involvement of
private sector organisations that are used to fielding worldwide, personal,
interoperable technology—the payment card schemes and/or the mobile network
operators make obvious candidates—is probably desirable.
Symmetry
It is vital that within the same hardware and software identity scheme “package”
(available to everyone because of the universality) is the means not only for the
holder to assert an identity or credentials, but to verify anyone else’s. This is
another improvement on Dr. Who’s basic scheme: my psychic paper and your
psychic paper can validate one another, if needed. In this way, everyone bears the
same relation to everyone else; the identity transaction does not in itself place one
party in any kind of authority over another. Just as a policeman may have a
perfectly valid reason to understand who I am (to a certain level of detail), so it
may be important for me to know the same of him: at least that he actually is a
policeman (which may be all that his psychic ID is permitted to show me); and
that the same policeman is the one who appears in court to give evidence against
me. By the same token, a gas board official to whom a leak has been reported
may wish to know that my elderly mother is the householder of the property he is
visiting; and she will want to know that he is a duly accredited person with a right
of entry into her private property.
Note that there is no suggestion that the symmetry is exploited automatically. If
the person entering the nightclub is trying to prove that they are a policeman, then
the “IS_A_PLOD” credential must be present. On the other hand, if the person
trying to enter the nightclub is trying to hide that they are in fact a policeman, then
the “IS_A_PLOD” credential must be concealed. This means that counterparties
cannot have uncontrolled access to all credentials. ID card holders must have the
ability to turn certain credentials on or off (or, more likely I think, display or conceal
particular virtual identities). For most people, most of the time, this is not a problem
but it must be addressed for the hard cases where it applies.
It is a matter for further consideration as to whether this ability should be universal
or whether there should be one or more “reserved” virtual identities that cannot be
disabled. Note also that while it may seem tedious to have to find terminals to change
data on the card, if the ID card is implemented in a phone these issues (setting default
identities, enabling and disabling identities and so forth) become trivial.
Speed
There is no greater barrier to adoption at the consumer level than inconvenience and
speed is fundamental to overcoming that barrier. For such a scheme to be become a
part of the fabric of life, psychic paper must be usable in the widest possible range of
circumstances and, in particular, in ordinary circumstances, such as a face-to-face
meetings. When it is thus familiar, it can move into other territory, for example
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remote transactions, for which there is no very good existing means of identity
verification—certainly not one that has achieved anything close to ubiquity. In fact,
as the escalating figures for “card not present” payment fraud in the U.K.
demonstrate, such means have proved elusive even in face of significant financial
incentive, let alone government policy.
In order to displace familiar mechanisms (as a first step to achieving still wider
utility), an identity utility must be better than them. We imagine that the benchmark
should be the swapping of business cards, so that the transaction should take no
more than a second or two. Of course, by digital means, other aspects of the
transaction can be improved within this transaction timescale: in particular, by the
use of cryptography, the privacy and integrity of the transaction can be improved by
several orders of magnitude.
Practicality
We must understand that the security demands of an identity infrastructure are such
that software solutions are not, by themselves, adequate to implement psychic ID.
There has to be some “token”, some item of tamper-resistant hardware (such as a
smart card) in addition to whatever device is being used for mutual authentication.
Of course, the best kind of psychic paper would combine both the smart card and the
mutual authentication device. There is only one realistic candidate for this at present:
the mobile phone. They already contain secure SIM cards, have a keyboard, have a
display, have communications and will soon, with the introduction of near-field
communication (NFC) be able to interact with smart cards (and each other) in high-
speed zero-configuration exchanges (Birch 2004). Thus, the swapping of business
cards will be accomplished by “kissing” phones2. In an instant, verified contact
details will be swapped, will appear on screen, and can be filed automatically in the
phone’s address book. The same identity transaction might be achieved by other
means according to convenience: by Bluetooth across a room; by SMS or data
connection to the next county; via USB cable and an internet-connected PC across
the world. As has been clear for some time, mobile operators will have a critical role
to play in the future of identity management (Edwards and Fieschi 2008), and the
introduction of NFC will further emphasis their key position.
One might envisage, to return to the familiar example, that a publican wishing to
verify that a patron is of legal drinking age could simply touch his phone to the
patron’s psychic ID, as illustrated in Fig. 7. If the patron’s picture is displayed, then
they are over 18. If the patron’s picture is not displayed, then they are not. Please
note that the phone in Fig. 7 is not an artist’s impression: it is a Nokia 6131NFC, as
used by Barclays Bank, mobile operator O2 and Transport for London in a London
pilot scheme that allowed customers to get on the bus and buy a coffee simply by
waving the phone over a suitable reader (eg, the same technology as the yellow
buttons used with Oyster contactless cards in London’s mass transit system). Such
phones are already in use for mass transit in Vienna and Frankfurt and tens of
2 “Kissing” is not a technical term: it just what we at Consult Hyperion have taken to calling zero-
configuration NFC peer-to-peer connections.
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millions of similar phones are in use in Japan, where consumers seem very happy to
use their mobile phone instead of plastic cards (Ohashi 2007).
Incidentally, while we haven’t focused on authentication (I’ve simply assumed
that the psychic ID will have a PIN and a local biometric for the verification of the
holder) mobile phones can also capture and transmit the most natural and convenient
biometric: voice. Challenge/response mechanisms, whereby the parties may ask each
other to repeat a random phrase, make remote and secure biometric authentication
more practical than other methods, and avoid the negative connotations of
fingerprints and iris scans.
Finally, the single most important property of the mobile phone is that everybody
already has one. People already take their psychic ID with them wherever they
go.
Extensibility
An infrastructure is something that can be built on and anyone should be able to do
this: much as the government builds roads and lets private companies design and
build cars, so anyone should be able to access the identity infrastructure. This has
some obvious implications around standards and interfaces: psychic ID needs to be
founded on the right standards, of course, but there are plenty to choose from. The
government should choose a profile through existing standards to define the U.K.’s
psychic paper implementation and the standards within that profile should be where
possible open. The security of the implementation should rest on secret keys, not
secret implementations: The recent tribulations of the Dutch national transit
implementation bear witness to this straightforward principle.
Note the critical architectural assumption underlying these requirements, which is
that none of the service providers can obtain the sector-specific identity number to
which they are entitled without going via the centralised identity broker that sits in
front of the NIR or the decentralised identity broker built in to the NIC.
Fig. 7 The “real” psychic paper
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Magic
We can implement an identity utility that meets all of these requirements through the
magic of cryptography. Take the example cited repeatedly in this paper, the use of
psychic ID at the nightclub. What is happening “under the hood”? In this example,
the steps might be as follows. The identity card reader at the door of the nightclub
sends a challenge to the customer’s psychic ID: let’s assume that it is a simple card
rather than a mobile phone. The challenge is, as previously noted, not really sent via
psychic brainwaves but via a very short-range radio-frequency communication at
13.56MHz (ISO standards 14443 and 18000). The challenge is signed using the
private key of the nightclub and is transmitted to the card together with a digital
certificate (digitally-signed by the Home Office) containing the nightclub’s public
key. This certificate tells the card that the nightclub is licensed to request age
verification. The card sends back the picture of the cardholder if the cardholder is
over 18 or a picture of a red “X” if the cardholder is under 18, digitally encrypted
using the nightclub’s public key that was contained in the certificate. This ensures
that only that specific nightclub can decode the message: Eavesdroppers cannot. The
nightclub reader decodes the message and displays the cardholder picture: The
nightclub doorman can easily see that the picture is, say, me and then let me in. All
of this takes place in a few hundred milliseconds, using tried and tested contactless
technology.
The combination of these tamper-resistant chips, wireless communications,
biometric authentication and cryptographic technologies that already exist are more
than adequate to deliver psychic ID with all of the desired characteristics. None of
these technologies have to be perfect in order to function together in a properly-
designed system that can tolerate imperfection: so, if the tamper-resistant chip is
counterfeited that should not mean that a biometric database entry can be duplicated
(in other words, counterfeit cards should not mean counterfeit identities) and,
similarly, if the database is compromised so that the biometric record can be altered
that should not mean that the on-card biometrics are changed.
Practical solution
Smart cards can do things that cardboard cards cannot (Birch 1996): This,
fundamentally, is why we need a new vision for national identity management that
is beyond the scheme abandoned by the U.K. in 1952 (Birch 2005). The psychic ID
vision for identity leads to an eminently practical solution that delivers the
apparently contradictory result of more security and more privacy, using existing
technology in an open and extensible way, allowing a new identity ecosystem to
grow and flourish. Essential to this practical implementation is the smart identity
device (which may be a card, mobile phone or something else in the future) that uses
the principles discussed in this paper. In day-to-day use, in the overwhelming
majority of cases where someone will be using their psychic ID, it will not be to
show who they are, but rather to prove something about themselves: they are entitled
to be in the UK, use the local leisure centre or read a particular e-mail. The psychic
ID card can disclose the relevant credentials with no need for access a central
database or with the unwarranted disclosure of other credentials—using well-known
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and well-understood cryptographic techniques—and this is what make will make it
a 21st century card (Birch 2007).
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